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1/522 agents with conﬂicting plans
• We are dealing with scenarios where 2 agents interact.
• The agents do not know the other agent’s goals.
• The goals may be conﬂicting.
• We will let each agent have an “assignment” which determines
its goals. The assignments are hidden for the other player.
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5/52Simple example environment
• An example scenario: The Grid Game.
• 2 players move 1 piece on a grid.
♣
• The players prefer to move the piece to some cells more than
others.
• How much a player prefers a cell is determined by her
Assignment.
• The player’s assignment is unknown to the opponent.
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9/52The rules
Moving the piece:
• Possible moves: N, E, S, W.
• The eﬀect on the piece is the combination of the 2 player’s
moves.
• If one player chooses a move which makes the joint move
impossible the piece is only moved in the direction the other
player has chosen if that can be carried out.
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{N,W} {N,S}
Assignment 1 Assignment 2
8.55 6.82 1.15
-6.82 0.0 4.12
-8.55 -1.15 -4.12
-1.66 0.42 6.84
-0.51 0.0 -0.42
-6.84 0.51 1.66
Figure: An example of the game Grid. In the ﬁrst move, P 1 chooses to
move N while P 2 chooses to move W. In the second turn, P 1 and P 2
moves N and S respectively, cancelling each other’s eﬀect.
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P2 : −1.66 − 8.55 = −10.21
13/52Opponent Modeling
• To deal successfully with this kind of game requires opponent
modeling.
• Equip each agent with a model of its opponent.
• Each model will contain models of the other agent which in
turn will contain a model of the ﬁrst agent.
• This inevitably results in an inﬁnite regress.
• Classical solutions to that is to ﬁnd Nash Equilibria.
14/52Recursive modeling
• Instead of solving Nash Equilibria we use the recursive
modeling method (RMM) (Gmytrasiewicz et al. [1991]).
• In RMM the recursion is ended at a certain level.
• A “ﬂat” model is inserted at the deepest level, i.e. a model
that does not contain models of other players.
15/52Covert Interference (CIF)
We propose a framework which we call Covert Interference (CIF).
W0 W1 W2 ...
P1
1 P1
2 ...
P2
1 P2
2 ...
U1 U2
A1 A2
Figure: Covert Interference.
16/52Covert Interference (CIF)
The model explains :
• How the hidden assignments are modeled using the chance
nodes A and B.
• The transition between states as a function of the two player’s
actions
• The utility functions.
• The opponent’s strategy - represented by a chance node.
The model does not tell us anything about:
• How many future time steps the agent considers.
• How many future time steps the opponent is assumed to
consider
• How deep a modeling level the opponent can be assumed to
have.
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18/52Deﬁnition of a (Perfect Recall) Player
In order to describe the missing parts of the model we give the
following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition (RMM Player)
A player P is a pair deﬁned as follows:
1 P = (h,NIL) is a player with time horizon h and modeling
level 0.
2 Given a player O, with modeling level i − 1, P = (h,O) is a
player with time horizon h and modeling level i.
19/52Examples
Thus,
• a (2,NIL) player is a player that takes into account 2 future
time steps and does not have a model of the opponent
(assumes random play).
• A (3,(2,NIL)) model takes 3 future time steps into account
while it assumes the opponent uses a (2,NIL) model.
• A (3,(3,(2,NIL))) model also takes into account 3 future time
steps while she assumes the opponent is a (3,(2,NIL)) model.
• etc.
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27/52Memory Complexity Problems
• Notice the extra arcs in the previous Figure!
• We assume No-forgetting.
• P2’s decision in P2
1 may reveal something about his
assignment.
• Thus, all previous board states and all our previous actions are
relevant to the next decision.
• The memory complexity becomes forbidding for playing the
game.
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32/52Limited memory inﬂuence diagrams
• Lauritzen and Nilsson [2000] have proposed Limited memory
inﬂuence diagrams (LIMIDS).
• They give up the no-forgetting assumption.
• The syntax is like IDs but the only thing known at decisions
are represented by information-arcs into that decision node.
• Lauritzen and Nilsson [2000] propose a solution algorithm for
LIMIDS, namely Single Policy Update (SPU).
33/52A LIMID Player
• With a lot of inspiration from LIMIDs we introduce a Limited
Memory Player (LIMID Player).
• A LIMID player has a certain look-ahead and modeling level,
just like perfect recall players, but
as opposed to perfect recall players they have a limited
memory.
• With a memory of m the LIMID player remembers the last m
decisions and the last m world
states.
34/52Deﬁnition of a LIMID Player
Deﬁnition (RMM LIMID Player)
A RMM LIMID player L is a triple deﬁned as follows:
1 L = (h,m,NIL) is a LIMID player with time horizon h,
memory m and modeling level 0.
2 Given a player or a LIMID player O, with modeling level i − 1,
P = (h,m,O) is a LIMID player with time horizon h, memory
m, and modeling level i.
35/52An example of a LIMID player
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Figure: An example of a (3,2,(3,1,(1,NIL))) model.
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40/52Single policy updating
• Convert all decision nodes into chance nodes starting with
uniform priors.
• Repeat until convergence:
• Starting from the last decision, ﬁnd the optimal policy for that
decision given the parents and insert that in the chance node.
• Proceed with the second last decision now knowing the policy
for the last decision.
• Continue ﬁnding local optimal policies down to the ﬁrst
decision.
41/52Single policy updating
• Convert all decision nodes into chance nodes starting with
uniform priors.
• Repeat until convergence:
• Starting from the last decision, ﬁnd the optimal policy for that
decision given the parents and insert that in the chance node.
• Proceed with the second last decision now knowing the policy
for the last decision.
• Continue ﬁnding local optimal policies down to the ﬁrst
decision.
42/52Single policy updating
• Convert all decision nodes into chance nodes starting with
uniform priors.
• Repeat until convergence:
• Starting from the last decision, ﬁnd the optimal policy for that
decision given the parents and insert that in the chance node.
• Proceed with the second last decision now knowing the policy
for the last decision.
• Continue ﬁnding local optimal policies down to the ﬁrst
decision.
43/52Single policy updating
• Convert all decision nodes into chance nodes starting with
uniform priors.
• Repeat until convergence:
• Starting from the last decision, ﬁnd the optimal policy for that
decision given the parents and insert that in the chance node.
• Proceed with the second last decision now knowing the policy
for the last decision.
• Continue ﬁnding local optimal policies down to the ﬁrst
decision.
44/52Single policy updating
• Convert all decision nodes into chance nodes starting with
uniform priors.
• Repeat until convergence:
• Starting from the last decision, ﬁnd the optimal policy for that
decision given the parents and insert that in the chance node.
• Proceed with the second last decision now knowing the policy
for the last decision.
• Continue ﬁnding local optimal policies down to the ﬁrst
decision.
45/52Experiments
In experiments we have investigated:
1 The allowed time horizon for players with perfect recall
compared to LIMID players.
2 The performance of the two models against a benchmark.
3 The importance of having the correct model of the opponent.
46/521. The allowed time horizon
Table: The maximal time horizons possible on our system with diﬀerent
sizes of the Grid game.
Board ID max h LIMID max h (m = 1)
3 × 3 4 32
5 × 5 3 8
7 × 7 3 8
9 × 9 2 8
47/522. The performance of the two models
Table: Average scores and standard deviations (σ) after 100 Grid games
between diﬀerent models against (2,(2,(1,NIL))).
Model P1 σ
1 (2,(2,(2,(1,NIL)))) 5.03 10.1
2 (2,1,(2,(2,(1,NIL)))) -0.248 8.66
3 (3,(2,(2,(1,NIL)))) 7.32 10,7
4 (3,2,(2,(2,(1,NIL)))) 0.252 8,27
48/523. The importance of having the correct
model of the opponent
Table: Average scores and standard deviations (italics) obtained by
players with h = 3 on diﬀerent levels in a 3 × 3 instance of Grid.
Level 0 1 2 3 4
1 2.47 – – – –
5.41 – – – –
2 -1.83 3.24 – – –
6.39 10.76 – – –
3 -3.19 -4.50 9.29 – –
7.64 10.9 10.5 – –
4 0.55 -4.60 -0.73 8.00 –
7.06 10.0 5.82 10.6 –
5 0.572 1.18 -6.21 4.40 5.78
6.36 7.34 10.8 10.0 8.84
49/52Conclusions & Future Research
• We have proposed a framework called CIF for solving agent
encounters when the goals of the opponents are uncertain.
• We have addressed the complexity problem caused by the
amount of relevant information.
• The empirical results for the LIMID player has shown a loss in
performance compared to perfect recall players.
• The modeling level of the opponent has turned out to be
important in order to successfully win the game. (Adaptation.)
• Current research: Investigate alternative opportunities for
model approximation.
50/52Thank You!
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